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Firms introducing network technologies (whose benefits depend on who installs the technology) need to
understand which user characteristics confer the greatest network benefits on other potential adopters. To
examine which adopter characteristics matter, I use the introduction of a video-messaging technology in an
investment bank. I use data on its 2,118 employees, their adoption decisions and their 2.4 million subsequent
calls. The video-messaging technology can also be used to watch TV. Exogenous shocks to the benefits of
watching TV are used to identify the causal (network) externality of one individual user’s adoption on others’
adoption decisions. I allow this network externality to vary in size with a variety of measures of informal
and formal influence. I find that adoption by either managers or workers in “boundary spanner” positions
has a large impact on the adoption decisions of employees who wish to communicate with them. Adoption
by ordinary workers has a negligible impact. This suggests that firms should target those who derive their
informal influence from occupying key boundary-spanning positions in communication networks, in addition
to those with sources of formal influence, when launching a new network technology.
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1. Introduction
Firms and consumers benefit from the diffusion rather than the creation of new technologies (Rogers
(2003)). Managing a technology’s diffusion is particularly challenging for technologies that become
more useful as more people adopt: Nobody wants to buy a telephone or video-conferencing unit if
there is no-one else in the network to communicate with. If welfare-enhancing technologies cannot
overcome this hurdle of attracting initial adopters, this inhibits the potential economic growth the
new technology can bring.
This potential for sub-optimal diffusion, first documented by Rohlfs (1974), has been formalized
into a theory of network externalities by economists such as Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and
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Saloner (1985). To validate this theoretical work, empirical researchers have sought to document
“network externalities”. Network externalities measure how much adoption decisions reflect who
else is in the network. If people adopt at the same time, however, it is difficult to know whether
this adoption was a product of network externalities or of something else.
One way of addressing this empirical challenge is to compare how adopters react to similar
regional networks that have different levels of adoption. However, this allows only the measurement
of an average network externality in response to an average level of adoption. It does not measure
individual responses to individual adoption decisions. Therefore, the network externalities literature
has not been able to fully incorporate a wide body of managerial research that highlights how some
key adopters can have a large influence on an individual’s adoption process through a variety of
social mechanisms.
To explore how network externalities vary at the individual level, I use video-messaging data that
tracks the adoption of 2,118 employees in a large bank and their 2.4 million subsequent calls. The
technology diffusion process somewhat resembled a large-scale experiment, because adoption deci-
sions were decentralized to employees. The advantage of studying this particular video-messaging
technology is that it has a stand-alone use of TV-watching that can be used to identify network
externalities. This ability to watch TV varies in usefulness by location and time. Some employees
were prompted to adopt the technology by TV programming such as the 2002 Soccer World Cup.
I measure the effect that this TV-inspired adoption has on other people’s adoption decisions.
I interpret this effect as showing the benefits that they receive from having that person in the
network to communicate with. Since employees’ communication networks differ, I can measure this
network externality at an individual level. For example, I can compare the adoption decisions of
two employees in the US, one who has many contacts based in countries where the Soccer World
Cup was popular, and another who does not. These individual-level data allow me to explore how
network externalities vary with any one adopter’s potential influence. For example, I can explore
whether a manager or a worker’s TV-inspired adoption has a bigger effect on others’ decisions to
adopt. Using this to identify a network externality requires there to be no systematic reason why
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an employee who has a high proportion of contacts in a region that is having a TV-watching spurt
should be more likely to adopt than an employee who has contacts in a region where there is no
TV-watching spurt.
The ability to measure how network externalities relate to network users’ characteristics allows
me to explore whether network externalities reflect the potential for subsequent video-messages to
differ in importance. Rogers (2003) describes two kinds of important conversations: Interactions
with those who are higher up in a formal social structure, and interactions with those who occupy
key positions in the informal communications structure. I explore what happens to the size of net-
work externalities when we adjust for whether an adopter is important by either of these measures.
I test a variety of measures of a user’s importance within a communications network. I find that
adopters who are high up in the formal hierarchy, or who occupy a boundary-spanning position
between groups of uncommunicative employees in the informal communications network, have big-
ger network externalities on the adoption decisions of others. I also find evidence that those who
occupy central positions in the communications network have a bigger network externality than
those who occupy peripheral positions.
These findings emphasize that the successful introduction of a technology characterized by net-
work externalities, depends on both people with formal influence and people with informal influence
adopting the technology. Therefore, it is crucial when introducing new technologies to ensure that
boundary spanners and those who are central to the firm’s communication network are targeted
to adopt quickly, in addition to those with formal sources of influence.
2. Network Externalities: Sociological and Economic Perspectives
This paper draws from both the economics literature on network externalities and the managerial
literature on network effects. These two literatures have developed largely in isolation from each
other.
Managerial and sociological researchers use the term “network effects” to refer to many processes
through which someone’s adoption can be influenced by another. Within the class of network
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effect models, two broad models can be distinguished (Burt (1987)). The first is the “contagion
by cohesion” model, where adoption is based on direct contact. The second model is a “structural
equivalence” model, where two people adopt the technology because they face a similar set of
norms. The term “network externalities” in this literature is restricted to interactive technologies
that offer a direct performance benefit from having more users. Network externalities are thought
of as a special case of contagion by cohesion (Bulte and Lilien (2007)).
Since work by Burt (1980) and Friedkin (1991), this managerial literature on diffusion has
documented in many different settings that adoption by key actors is associated with a larger
number of subsequent adoptions. Typical of this work is Podolny and Stuart (1995)’s study of
how niche technologies develop based on the patent holders’ status. There has also been a stream
of research that documents how social influence can lead to technology adoption bandwagons
(Strang and Macy (2001), Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993)). Early research in marketing by
Czepiel (1974) documented similar effects for word of mouth in the steel industry and studied how
high centrality affected how quickly potential adopters found out information. This emphasis on
heterogeneity of social processes is also echoed in a broader communications literature, described
by Monge and Contractor (2003). I use this insight, that highly central actors can affect social
learning, cascades and informational spill-overs, and test whether the same applies to the case of
network externalities. Generally, network externalities have received less specific attention in this
sociological literature because network externalities are a mechanical property of the technology
(it mechanically becomes more useful as more people have it) rather than necessarily reflecting an
underlying social process.
While sociologists use the term “network effects” to encompass a wide number of social processes,
economists use “network effects” as a conservative way of describing what sociologists would call
“network externalities”. This reflects caution by economists about assuming a coordination failure,
or “externality”, before there is evidence that one exists. For example, in this paper, while it seems
plausible that TV-inspired adopters do not internalize the benefits that their adoption brings to
others, I present no direct proof that this is so. Furthermore, using the term “network externality”
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implies that the network owner does not internalize the benefits of widespread adoption in their
pricing or incentive strategy, which is rare (Liebowitz and Margolis (1994)). In this paper, I use
the less conservative term “network externalities” in order to be accessible to non-economists. The
focus of empirical work in the economics literature has been to measure these “network effects”
(externalities), and to distinguish the benefit that people receive from widespread adoption from
the broader set of influences which might cause similar people to adopt. This focus on establishing
a convincing identification strategy for network externalities stems from research by skeptics such
as Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) who doubt the prevalence of network externalities. In the face of
this skepticism that a coordination failure can persist in a systematic manner, empirical researchers
have focused on finding convincing ways of identifying causal network externalities that cannot
plausibly be ascribed to measurement error.
Early economics work on measuring network externalities used standard panel data techniques.
These control for static differences in agents and also for a universal time trend. For example,
Saloner and Shepard (1994) used region and time dummies when studying correlations in adoption
of ATM networks by banks. Such empirical work, however, makes the strong assumption that there
are no network-specific time shocks, such as a regional sales effort by ATM vendors, that could
provide an alternative explanation of correlation in adoption decisions. Similarly, when studying
the spreadsheet market for computers, Gandal (1994) and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) use
time dummies to control for broad time trends, but cannot distinguish network externalities from
product-specific shocks, such as an unmeasured increase in promotional activity. This criticism
also applies to researchers using panel data outside of economics. For example, Kraut et al. (1998)
studied network externalities for a video-phone system similar to the one studied in this paper.
They controlled for time-specific shocks but did not control for unobservable differences across
work groups over time that could be mistakenly interpreted as network externalities, such as a
slowdown in demand where all employees in the work group had spare time to adopt.
The problems of using standard panel data methods to identify network externalities have led
researchers such as Rysman (2004), Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) and Tucker (2004) to use
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instrumental variables to identify network externalities. They use a regional network-specific shock,
such as adoption by a multi-region bank, as a source of exogenous variation for existing levels
of adoption. Then, they measure how potential adopters respond to these exogenous changes in
regional adoption. This approach has two limitations. First, it is difficult at the aggregate regional
level to identify shocks that are unrelated to the characteristics of firms that are located there.
For example, Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) assume that entry by a multi-region bank is
unrelated to unobserved changes in technology tastes. Second, studying network externalities at
this aggregated regional level does not allow study of how highly central actors affect diffusion.
Instead, Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) take adoption by central actors such as multi-region
banks as an exogenous shock that can be used to identify the reactions of smaller actors.
This difficulty in establishing causation at the individual level is widespread in many marketing
and managerial problems, not just for network externalities. For example, in the case of switching
costs, it is difficult to disentangle an individual’s level of lock-in from their idiosyncratic preferences
for a good (see Goldfarb (2006)’s study on consumer choices for internet portals). Therefore, one
aim of this paper is to describe how individual data can be used to establish causation in a way
that could be used to explore individual heterogeneity for these other managerial questions.
The contribution of my research is that I identify for the first time network externalities at the
individual level, without strong assumptions about strategic behavior or an aggregate functional
form of the network externality. The fact that the technology I study has a separate stand-alone
use of TV-watching which is subject to a series of exogenous shocks makes it unusually possible
to identify network externalities, despite the similarity of users’ network use. What is unique
about the identification strategy in this paper is that the exogenous variation comes at the level
of the individual’s network rather than the aggregate network. I use this individual data in two
ways. First, I use exogenous variation in individual adoption incentives to identify the impact
of adoption by one agent on related agents. Second, data at the individual level allow me to
identify the differential impact of adoption by different types of adopters. In particular. I explore
whether the many managerial insights into how highly central actors affect diffusion also apply
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to network externalities. It also reflects a nascent literature in economics, such as Sundararajan
(2004)’s theoretical model of heterogeneity in network consumption.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 3 describes the video-messaging technology
and the data and Section 4 sets up the empirical approach. Section 5 discusses the TV-watching
identification strategy. Section 6 discuss the results and managerial implications. Section 7 discusses
an important extension to the main results, where I use a predicted version of the underlying
video-messaging networks to study the behavior of employees who do not adopt.
3. Technology and Data
3.1. Technology
Installing video-messaging can improve the effectiveness of internal firm communication, by adding
visual cues to the audio cues provided by telephones. Marlow (1992) describes the benefits of video-
messaging as greater intimacy, geographic reach, flexibility and effectiveness in communications.
Many older video-messaging systems were not popular because they were placed in isolated
video-conferencing rooms. This research studies a more convenient form of video-messaging placed
on desktop computers. The technology has three elements: Video-messaging software; a media
compressor attached to the employee’s computer; and a camera fixed on top of the computer’s
monitor. Using the language of Farrell and Saloner (1985), the video-messaging technology has
a “network use” and a “stand-alone use.” The network use is television-quality video-messaging
calls. The stand-alone use is watching TV on a desktop computer.
After this bank chose this particular technological standard to conduct internal video-messaging,
it invested in an extensive network architecture. The firm made employees eligible to adopt the
technology if they held a position of Associate or higher (85% of full time employees). The firm
publicized the technology to employees using mass e-mail messages. Then, for institutional and
business reasons, they decided to decentralize individual adoption decisions to employees. Each
employee decided whether and when to order a video-messaging unit from an external sales repre-
sentative. The supplier of the equipment had excess capacity, so capacity constraints did not affect
the timing of individual employee adoption. This decentralization means that the unit of analysis
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is the private benefits of adoption for employees, as opposed to the firm-level benefits of widespread
adoption.
The bank incurred all monetary costs of using the technology. Though the employee did not
pay for the technology, they did suffer a temporary loss of productivity from not being able to use
their computer while the technology was being installed, and they also had to spend time learning
how to use it. Talking to employees at the bank, the risk of prolonged computer “downtime” was
viewed as the most substantial cost. In particular, fears were expressed about not having access to
or being able to act upon constantly changing financial market data. Therefore, each employee had
to set their perceived network and stand-alone use against their non-monetary costs of adopting.
The video-messaging technology is used only for internal communication within the firm. Having
data on the universe of network interactions makes such closed-loop technologies attractive for
empirical research.
3.2. Data
3.2.1. Personnel Database I have complete personnel records for each employee in the
investment bank in March 2004. Employees were associated with two main products: Equities
and derivatives. There were four broad different functions: Administration, Research, Trading and
Sales. There is also information on the precise city location of each employee. I classify these loca-
tions into four broad regions: Britain, North America, Europe and Asia/Sub-Equatorial. There
were four formal rungs in the hierarchy for employees at the firm. I combine the bottom two rungs
“Associate” and “Vice-President” into the category “Workers”, and the top two rungs “Director”
and “Managing Director” into the category “Managers.” 25.8% of employees were Managers.
A call database recorded the 2.4 million video-messaging calls made within the bank from Jan-
uary 2001 to August 2004. For two-way video-messaging calls, the database records the caller and
callee, when the call was made and how long it lasted. For one-way TV calls, the database records
who made the call, to which TV channel, when and for how long.
Employees made 1,768,348 two-way user-to-user video-messaging calls. The dataset includes only
the 1,052,110 video-messaging calls where the callee accepted the call. Each accepted call lasted
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on average 5 minutes and 46 seconds. Calls could be made to more than one employee at a time.
Multi-party calls (less than 5 percent of calls) were simplified into their pairwise equivalents: A
three-way call is treated as three calls between each two of the participants. I use the first 2.5 years
of the call data (from Jan 2001-Jul 2003) to examine calling decisions, and the last year of the call
data (from Aug 2003-Aug 2004) to reconstruct the communications network within the firm.
Employees made 752,055 one-way caller-to-media-device calls. 741,926 of these calls were success-
ful and included in the data. Since I want to control for regional-specific time trends, I focus on the
use of the video-messaging technology for watching regional television broadcasts. Employees could
also watch CNN and CNBC, but there is little cross-national variation in the proportion of employ-
ees watching these channels. Local channels for Europe were ZDF (German), ARD (German),
Kanal (Swedish), ORF (Austria) and Eurosport. Local channels for Britain were ITV, SkySports,
Channel 4 and BBC. Local channels for the US were CSPAN, FOX, NBC and CBS. Local channels
for Asia were NTV (Nippon TV), CATS (Japanese), TV-Asia, and BBC 24 World Service.
4. Empirical Approach
I want to examine how adoption by different types of employees affects when and whether another
employee adopts video-messaging. To do this I employ a latent variable approach, where I model
each employee’s adoption as a reflection of the trade-off they face between the network and stand-
alone benefits and costs of adopting the technology. The dependent variable is an indicator for
when an employee first makes a video-messaging call. Since there is no divestiture, I treat this
adoption decision as irreversible and exclude subsequent observations in estimation.
4.1. Network Externalities: Network Benefits of Adoption
Employees receive network benefits from using this technology because they can communicate with
colleagues using video rather than telephones. In addition to the benefits of being able to see each
other when talking, the video-messaging technology offers auto-dial and “frequent contacts” lists.
These features offer convenience relative to the existing telephone network. These network benefits
explicitly depend on having other people also in the network. This paper makes the simplifying
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assumption that all employees take other employees’ adoption decisions as given, and do not look
forward to the impact that their adoption can have on others in the future. In Ryan and Tucker
(2007), I explore the implications for the dynamics of the network when this assumption is relaxed.
I assume that network externalities depend only on the subset of adopting employees that
employee i interacts with. This is supported by results in Table EC.10 and Tucker (2007), which
show that network externalities are limited to direct contacts. I define employees as “contacts” if
they video-message when both employees have adopted. I use data on whether employees shared
a video-messaging call from August 2003-August 2004 to establish who each adopter’s contacts
are. These last 12 months form a reliably stable communications network: only 90 new adoptions
occurred during this year, relative to the 1,294 in the previous 2.5 years. Given this stability,
the precise choice of the months August 2003-August 2004 as a representative network does not
affect contact predictions. Using a shorter snapshot such as (March 2003-June 2003) and (March
2003-December 2004) changes the composition of contacts for adopters by less than 5 percent.
It is important to be clear that my use of video-messaging data to establish contacts means
that any network I recover is explicitly a network for video-messaging, that can be used to mea-
sure the size of network benefits/externalities for video-messaging conversations. It need not be
representative of the social network in the firm as a whole.
These call data identify contacts for the 1,294 adopters, not for the 824 non-adopters. Initially
I present empirical results for the influence of network externalities on the adoption timing of
adopters. In section 7, I incorporate decisions by non-adopters by using the call data to predict
their contacts. These later estimates capture the influence of network externalities on whether
employees ever adopt, as well as how quickly they adopt.
The baseline measure of the “installed base” for an employee is the number of their contacts
who have adopted the technology up to and including that month.1
1 As I study direct network externalities, the installed base in my study is the subset of adoption decisions that matter
to a potential adopter. This is different from the widespread use of the term “installed base” to refer to the universe
of downstream adopters from the perspective of an upstream vendor when there are indirect network externalities.
See Goldfarb (2006).
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However, given my focus on how heterogeneity of network user characteristics affects adoption,
I weight this basic measure to vary in magnitude depending on the characteristics of each contact.
4.2. Introducing Heterogeneity into the Contact Network
In my empirical analysis, I use six different measures of contact heterogeneity and weight the rela-
tive importance of each contact’s adoption. These measures are intended to cover a wide spectrum
of the social mechanisms affecting diffusion that are documented in the sociological literature (Burt
(2000)). I first consider managerial status as a way that formal social structure may change the
size of network externalities. Theories of hierarchy suggest that conversations with managers may
be more crucial, so there may be larger network externalities for others when a manager adopts.
In addition to formal hierarchical status, it seems likely that conversations may vary in impor-
tance and consequently network externalities may vary in size if a contact has a higher amount
of informal influence in the underlying communications network. To reflect informal influence, I
use measures developed for social network analysis. These measures of “network centrality”, or
the importance of a contact in the underlying communications network topology, are described
in detail in Table 1. I study three older measures of centrality: closeness, degrees and between-
ness (Freeman (1977) and Granovetter (1973)), and also the more recent “Bonacich Power”. Like
Google’s PageRank system for hyperlinks, Bonacich Power weights a contact’s importance by how
important their contacts are (Bonacich (1987)).2 A technical description of how each of the mea-
sures is calculated is available in the online appendix (Table EC.5) . Finally, I include a measure
of geographic distance between two contacts to measure whether video-messaging conversations,
and consequently network externalities, become more valuable for geographically distant contacts.
Table 1 describes how different types of influence may affect the size of network externalities.
Though these types of influence have been found to be important for other social influence mecha-
nisms, it is not clear that they will hold for network externalities. For example, it is not clear that
adoption by an employee with many other contacts will be more valuable than adoption by an
2 Calculated using an attenuation factor of β=1 implying an increase in importance with contact’s importance.
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Table 1 Different Types of Heterogeneity
Influence Measure Description Possible effect on how important it is
to video-message with contact
Measure of Formal Influence
Managerial Status Whether a contact is a man-
ager (Director or higher)
Conversations with managers are more
important
Measure of Informal Influence
Betweenness How many times a contact lies
on the shortest network path
between two other employees
Conversations with boundary spanners are
more valuable as they have unique access
to information
Closeness The average length of the
shortest path between the con-
tact and all other employees
Conversations with central employees
have more value than conversations with
employees on periphery of firm
Degrees How many contacts a contact
has
Conversations with employees who have
more conversations are more valuable
because they contain more information
Bonacich Power How powerful the contact’s
network is
Conversations with employees who have
more conversations with other different
employees who have more conversations
are valuable because they contain more
information
Distance Distance in km between the
employee’s city and the con-
tact’s city
Conversations with video-messaging are
valuable for contacts who are located far
away, as it prevents tedious air travel
employee with few contacts. Having many contacts could indicate that the employee communicates
multiple streams of trivial information, meaning that the value of video-messaging conversations
with that employee would be lower.
I calculate these measures of centrality for each employee who adopted using software developed
by Borgatti et al. (2002). All the measures of informal status use different units. Therefore, in my
empirical specifications, I use a mean centered and standardized index of each of these measures, to
ease comparison between their relative effect on the size of network externalities. The distribution
of these standardized measures is displayed in Figure 1.
4.3. Controls
It is likely that the net costs of adopting the technology vary considerably across employees. For
example, it may be easier for employees in more flexible areas, such as research, to schedule time for
their computers to be down, than for employees who work in fast-paced areas such as derivatives
trading. Therefore, I include a series of controls for each of the different functions and product
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Figure 1 Distribution of Centrality Measures
groups. Similarly, there may be cross-national differences in technological competence and expected
learning costs. To capture this I also include controls for each region. It is also likely that the
net costs of adopting vary across time. Therefore, I include a series of dummies for each month
that employees could potentially adopt the technology. Since these time dummies will also pick up
selection and the changing baseline hazard rate, they cannot be interpreted.
This technology also had specific benefits that were independent of any network usage. In par-
ticular, employees enjoyed being able to watch television on their desktop computer. There were
two types of television employees could watch: News TV programming on CNN and CNBC, which
covers financial news; and local TV programming (often non-news) broadcast by country-specific
channels. While there was little variation across regions in the percentage of adopters watching
news programming, there was large variation in employee interest in local TV programming across
regions. For example, employees in UK watched the 2002 Soccer World Cup, while employees in the
US did not. Empirically, these local broadcast events were correlated with adoption in the month
prior to the month they occur. This suggests that employees adopted the technology in advance to
ensure they could watch predictable “must-see” television. I capture these regional shocks to the
Tucker: Identifying Influence in Network Externalities
14 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-0001-1922.65
technology’s stand-alone benefit by the variable TVrt which contains the percentage of previous
adopters watching “Local TV” in region r in the month following time t.
The video-messaging unit’s TV use led to a less systematic pattern of adoption than is common
for communication technologies. Table EC.3 shows that there is no monotonic relationship between
adoption timing and the post-adoption intensity of usage of the technology. It is striking that
those who adopted in May 2002 just prior to the World Cup make an average of only 8 calls a
month, compared to the all-employee average of 17 calls a month. I use this regional variation in
the stand-alone benefit to help identify a causal network externality.
5. Identification of Network Externalities
A network externality occurs when one employee adopts because they wish to video-message with
another employee who has already adopted. The challenge is to quantify this. A correlation in the
timing of two contacts’ adoption does not conclusively demonstrate a network externality. This
coincident timing could happen for many other reasons. For example, their boss could instruct
two contacts to adopt a technology at the same time, or they could receive two contemporaneous
calls from a sales rep. This endogeneity of adoption decisions resembles Manski (1993)’s distinction
between contextual/correlated effects and endogenous effects in the social interactions literature.
One way of estimating a true network externality, therefore, would be if there had been a field
experiment where a few employees were randomly selected to adopt. This randomness would mean
that I could subsequently study the subsequent adoption decisions of two other employees who
were otherwise identical, except that one of them had a contact who had been randomly com-
manded to adopt. Such intentional randomization is not present. However, in the data there is a
lot of quasi-random adoption that is prompted by variation in the value of watching TV across
months and across regions. Therefore, I use this variation as a natural experiment to approximate
a true randomized trial. In particular, I exploit the fact the installed base of two employees in
the same work group and location will receive different shocks, because they have contacts who
value watching TV differently because they live in different regions. On average, fewer than 20%
of employees in a work group had an identical regional composition of contacts.
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I use instrumental variables to reflect this quasi-random adoption. I instrument for each month
the heterogeneity-weighted measure of employee i’s installed base using the heterogeneity-weighted
average TV benefit for each of their contacts j. A contact’s TV-watching benefit for that month
is the proportion of previous adopters watching local TV in that contact’s region in the next
month. For each month and for each employee, I calculate the average TV benefit of each employee
i’s worker and manager contacts j 1/n
∑n
j TVjrt. When I incorporate heterogeneity in informal
influence into measures of the installed base, I weight the instrument accordingly.
The Soccer World Cup in June 2002 illustrates the identification strategy. Figure 2 shows how
the percentage of this bank’s employees who watch local TV programming varied across the US
and UK in 2002. While the Soccer World Cup in June 2002 elicited great interest from employees
in the UK, it did not interest many employees in the US. The World Cup is associated with a spike
in adoptions in the UK in May 2002. There is no May spike in the US - but there is a smaller
spike in June. Figure 3 shows that the spike in adoptions in the US in June 2002 is dominated by
employees in the US reacting to the TV-inspired adoption of the technology by their contacts in
the UK. This anecdote illustrates the identification strategy. I do not count all earlier adoption by
i’s contacts as necessarily causing i’s adoption. Instead, I use variation in employee i’s contacts’
adoption that can be predicted by variation in the stand-alone (TV) benefit. For this to identify a
causal network externality requires that there be no systematic reason why an employee who has
a high proportion of contacts in a region that is having a TV-watching spurt should be more likely
to adopt than an employee who does not have contacts in that region.
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Figure 2 Relationship between new adoptions and TV-watching in the US and UK, 2002
Figure 3 Relationship between new adoptions and US employees having any UK contacts, 2002
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6. Estimation and Results
As discussed by Allison (1982), discrete-time hazard models can be estimated using standard binary
discrete choice models such as a binary probit, if all the data are organized into a panel and all post-
adoption observations are deleted. Since empirical methods for dealing with endogeneity are more
advanced for discrete choice models than hazard models, I follow a discrete choice specification.
I estimated each employee’s response to the installed base using Newey’s two-step minimum chi-
squared estimator for probit with endogenous regressors (Newey (1987), eq. 5.6). My specification
includes instrumented measures of the installed base for each adopter, control variables for the TV
benefit in the potential adopter’s region, and dummy variables for product, region, function, title
and every month. Table 2 displays summary statistics for each of the main regression variables.
To illustrate my identification strategy, I first present results from a simple regression where I
measure separately how a potential adopter responds to adoption by manager and worker contacts.
This allows a simple measure of whether formal position in the hierarchy matters for the size
of network externalities. I stratify my estimation by whether the potential adopter is a manager
or worker. The estimates are reported in Table 3. A rough calculation of marginal effects at the
mean value suggest that adoption by a manager contact increases the probability of a manager
adopting by 0.02, up from a baseline probability of adoption of 0.10 in each month. Adoption by
a worker contact has a negligible effect on a manager’s adoption decision. Adoption by a manager
contact increases the probability of a worker adopting by 0.007, up from a baseline of 0.05 in each
month. Adoption by a worker contact has a far smaller marginal effect on other workers’ adoption
decisions, of 0.002. Therefore, an increase in the installed base of managers for employee i has a
larger effect on i’s adoption decision than an increase in the installed base of workers.
The influence of television, as measured by the percentage of previous adopters watching tele-
vision in that region, is positive and significant. The estimates for the “pull” of television were
greater for workers rather than managers. This implies more generally that when firms introduce
network technologies, they should focus on a compelling stand-alone use to ease initial adoption.
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Table 2 Description of all variables used in regressions
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
FirstAdoptionit Indicator Variable for first month a worker makes outward video-
messaging call
0.05 0.244




Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
InstalledManagerit Sum of cumulative adoption by employee i’s contacts who have a
title of Director or higher by month t
1.309 1.641
InstalledManagerit (Bet) InstalledManagerit weighted to reflect each manager contact’s stan-
dardized betweenness score
1.486 2.782
InstalledManagerit (Closeness) InstalledManagerit weighted to reflect each manager contact’s stan-
dardized closeness score
0.263 0.485
InstalledManagerit (Degrees) InstalledManagerit weighted to reflect each manager contact’s stan-
dardized number of degrees (contacts)
1.585 2.798
InstalledManagerit (Power) InstalledManagerit weighted to reflect each manager contact’s stan-
dardized power score
0.035 1.019
InstalledManagerit(Distance) InstalledManagerit weighted to reflect the standardized distance
index between i and each manager contact
-0.311 1.271
InstalledWorkerit Sum of cumulative adoption by employee i’s contacts who have a
title lower than Director by month t
7.684 8.705
InstalledWorkerit (Bet) InstalledWorkerit weighted to reflect each worker contact’s stan-
dardized betweenness score
9.313 11.818
InstalledWorkerit (Closeness) InstalledWorkerit weighted to reflect each worker contact’s stan-
dardized closeness score
1.569 1.993
InstalledWorkerit (Degrees) InstalledWorkerit weighted to reflect each worker contact’s stan-
dardized number of degrees
10.442 13.755
InstalledWorkerit (Power) InstalledWorkerit weighted to reflect each worker contact’s stan-
dardized power score
-0.094 1.644
InstalledWorkerit (Distance) InstalledWorkerit weighted to reflect the standardized distance
index between i and each worker contact
-2.271 5.769
TVrt Proportion of adopters in the employee’s region r who have adopted
prior to month t who watch local television channels in month t+ 1
0.336 0.359
Controls for Regions Dummies for Europe, Asia, US and UK
Controls for Month Dummies for each month from February 2001 to August 2003
Controls for Product Dummies for equity and derivatives product group
Controls for Function Dummies for working in administration, research, trading and sales
Total Observations 12723
The instruments for the counts of the installed base are significant at the 1 percent level. The
importance of the instrumental variables strategy is shown by comparing regular probit estimates
(in the first column of Table 3) with the two-step results. The probit estimates are larger. This
suggests that without the instrumentation strategy, correlated effects would wrongly be identified
as network externalities. In some cases, this could inflate estimates of network externalities by 50
percent. Furthermore, the probit estimates are not identically larger across the different installed
base measures, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity differs systematically across different
contacts. This makes a crude comparison of the relative magnitude problematic.
I augment these results using measures of formal hierarchical influence and the informal social
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Table 3 Instrumentation Strategy
Managers Workers
Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV
[-2ex] Actual Installed Manager 0.1423*** 0.0994*** 0.0674*** 0.0645**
(0.0182) (0.0261) (0.0187) (0.0251)
Actual Installed Worker -0.0021 0.0030 0.0213*** 0.0177***
(0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0032) (0.0038)
TV in employee’s region 0.1808* 0.2008** 0.3438*** 0.3790***
(0.0927) (0.0948) (0.0745) (0.0755)
Observations 4635 4635 8088 8088
Dependent Variable: Indicator for when an employee first makes an outward video-messaging call
Sample: Adopters who have not yet made a video-messaging call
Dummies for month, region, title, product included in all regressions
Instruments for the installed base are the average TV valuation of each employee’s manager and worker contacts.
TV valuation is measured by the % of prior adopters who watch local TV in that contact’s region in the next month.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
system implied by the communications data. This use of call data extends previous work such as
Kraut et al. (1998) on video-messaging diffusion, that lacked such data to incorporate into their
analysis. The results are displayed separately for workers and managers in Table 4. Each column
reports results for a different specification, where I allow the installed base (and consequently
the instrument) to be weighted by a different measure of a contact’s informal influence. A rough
calculation of the relative magnitudes of the marginal effects is provided in Table 5. These marginal
effects should be interpreted as the effect on potential adopter i of adoption by employee j, when
employee j is one standard deviation above the mean by that measure of informal influence. I
discuss the relative impact of these measures of informal influence in turn.
“Betweenness” is, loosely, the number of times that the employee lies along the shortest path
between two employees in the video-messaging network. Network externalities may increase in size
with betweenness if conversations with contacts who occupy boundary-spanning positions in the
video-messaging network prove more valuable. Adoption by a manager who has a betweenness level
that is one standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood of a manager adopting by an
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insignificant amount and of a worker adopting by 0.004. This is lower than the unweighted measure
of network externalities for managers. This suggests that introducing betweenness for managers
introduces measurement error, and that managers who are more “between” have no larger impact
than those who are less between. Adoption by a worker who has a betweenness level that is one
standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood of a manager adopting by 0.001 and of
a worker adopting by 0.002. This is larger than the unadjusted measure, in particular for potential
adopters who are managers.
The fact that incorporating betweenness into measures of influence can turn measures of network
externalities upside down is plausible. Previous work by managerial researchers emphasizes that
betweenness can confer power outside of the hierarchy. Burt (1992)’s work on “structural holes”
highlights how those who broker gaps in communication networks wield social capital. Outside
the sociological literature, Hansen (1999)and Tushman (1977) discuss the importance of boundary
spanners for knowledge and innovation sharing.
“Closeness” is a measure of how few stages it takes a contact to reach everyone else on the
network. Visually, contacts who are in the center of a network are more likely to be “close” than
contacts on the periphery. Network externalities may increase with closeness, if employees find it
more valuable to talk with employees who are central rather than peripheral to the firm. However,
it could also be that adoption by non-close employees will have larger network externalities on
adoption by others, since video-messaging allows potential adopters to track down people who
are hard to reach by other means. Adoption by a worker who has a closeness level that is one
standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood of a manager adopting by 0.007 and of
a worker adopting by 0.008. Adoption by a manager who has a closeness level that is one standard
deviation above the mean increases the likelihood of a worker adopting by 0.04 and of a manager
adopting by 0.027. As Figure 1 shows, the distribution of this measure is highly skewed in a bi-
modal manner, making any interpretation questionable. However, these results do provide some
evidence that those who have above-average closeness also confer larger network externalities than
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the norm. This implies that network externalities are larger in general for employees who occupy
central rather than peripheral positions in the firm.
“Degree” is a measure of how many contacts an employee’s contact has. Network externalities
may be larger for contacts that have many contacts because they have more access to information.
Adoption by a worker who has a number of contacts that is one standard deviation above the
mean increases the likelihood of both a worker and a manager adopting by 0.001. A comparison
to the unweighted results suggests that having a large number of contacts leads workers to have a
larger network externality on others than workers who have few contacts. However, adoption by a
manager who has a number of contacts that is one standard deviation above the mean increases
the likelihood of a worker adopting by 0.005 and has an insignificant impact on other managers.
This suggests that, like with betweenness, the impact of a manager’s adoption does not vary
systematically with their number of contacts. In general, the results that incorporate degrees into
the measure of network externalities resemble (at a smaller magnitude) those for betweenness. This
is unsurprising, given that there is a 0.82 correlation between the two measures - having more
contacts mechanically increases the likelihood of spanning boundaries between them. The fact that
the estimates for the effect of betweenness are larger, however, makes it plausible that betweenness
is the more crucial measure.
“Bonacich Power” is a measure of how important an employee’s contacts’ contacts are. Net-
work externalities may increase with Bonacich Power if employees weight conversations with well-
connected contacts more. Weighting the installed base by this measure led to a series of insignificant
and negative point estimates, suggesting that in this case the mere fact of being connected to
important people was not enough to lead a contact to have a large network externality on the
adoption decision of others.
The distance weighting I use is simply a measure of whether network externalities increase
with linear distance between two employees.3 It might be reasonable to assume that I value a
3 I obtain similar results when using non-parametric specifications that reflect whether workers and managers are on
different continents.
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conversation by video-messaging more if my contact is far away, because I benefit from not having
to make an arduous business trip. I find, however, that this logic applies only to the adoption
responses of managers to the adoption of far-flung manager contacts. By contrast, workers seem to
receive larger network externalities from other workers who are closer to them. One interpretation
of this result is that it is only conversations with managers that warrant actual travel and that
managers, being older, prefer to avoid long-distance travel more than workers. Another possible
interpretation is that employees in general do not value conversations with workers who are located
a long way away from them, perhaps because they tend to be located in more peripheral offices such
as in South-east Asia and Australia. Alternatively, video-conferencing may serve as a complement
to face-to-face communication, rather than a substitute for these workers (this is discussed in the
theoretical literature such as Gaspar and Glaeser (1998), Daft and Lengel (1986)).
6.1. Robustness
Generally, with panel data, we are concerned about controlling for the unobserved component in
the error term. For example, researchers may wish to control for unobserved individual-level het-
erogeneity, such as systematic differences in technological aptitude. By contrast, in an experimental
setting, the randomized nature of the treatment controls for such correlation across and within
subjects. Similarly, if the exogenous shocks that underlie instrumental variables are randomly dis-
tributed, then they should also control for such serial correlation across and within subjects. This
suggests that if instruments are valid, the instrumented endogenous variable is unrelated to unob-
served components of the error term. However, it is common for researchers who combine panel
data with instrumental variables also to provide robustness checks. This both checks for robustness
and controls for any unobserved systematic relationship between shifts in instruments and individ-
uals in the data. In this section, I discuss the various specifications that I have used to ensure the
robustness of my results.
The Newey two-step estimator does not offer the same flexibility for specifying the error term
as maximum likelihood. It is impossible, however, for two endogenous installed base measures
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Table 4 Centrality Measures: Effect on Timing of Adoption
Managers
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
Installed Worker 0.0030 0.0077*** 0.0366* 0.0057** -0.0279 -0.0140**
(0.0054) (0.0028) (0.0209) (0.0028) (0.0220) (0.0065)
Installed Manager 0.0994*** 0.0152 0.2134** 0.0143 -0.0263 0.0483*
(0.0261) (0.0109) (0.0841) (0.0129) (0.0331) (0.0281)
TV in employee’s region 0.2008** 0.1959** 0.1762* 0.2079** 0.3302*** 0.2740***
(0.0948) (0.0928) (0.0937) (0.0935) (0.0881) (0.0916)
Observations 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635
Workers
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
Installed Worker 0.0177*** 0.0123*** 0.0712*** 0.0092*** -0.0128 -0.0206***
(0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0178) (0.0025) (0.0196) (0.0060)
Installed Manager 0.0645** 0.0251* 0.3132*** 0.0395*** -0.0284 0.0117
(0.0251) (0.0135) (0.1138) (0.0147) (0.0345) (0.0353)
TV in employee’s region 0.3790*** 0.3744*** 0.3777*** 0.3639*** 0.4633*** 0.3996***
(0.0755) (0.0746) (0.0756) (0.0760) (0.0714) (0.0726)
Observations 8088 8088 8088 8088 8088 8088
Dependent Variable: Indicator for when an employee first makes an outward video-messaging call
Sample: Adopters who have not yet made a video-messaging call
Dummies for month, region, title, product included in all regressions
Instruments for the heterogeneity-weighted installed base are the heterogeneity-weighted TV valuation of each
employee’s manager and worker contacts. TV valuation is measured by the % of prior adopters who watch local TV
in that contact’s region in the next month.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 5 Marginal Effects
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
For Manager Adopters
Installed Worker X 0.001*** 0.007** 0.001* X -0.0024*
Installed Manager 0.017*** X 0.027** X X 0.007*
For Worker Adopters
Installed Worker 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.001*** X -0.0024***
Installed Manager 0.007** 0.004* 0.040** 0.005** X X
Only significant estimates reported * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
to converge in a discrete framework under maximum likelihood. It is possible to use maximum
likelihood for a linear probability model, and to estimate for this linear model robust/standard
errors clustered by region. The results given in tables EC.6 and EC.7 retain statistical significance.
Allowing for correlation within specialization, regions and functions produced qualitatively similar
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results. The irreversibility of the adoption decision prevents the estimation of individual fixed effects
over time or other methods that econometricians commonly use to deal with serial correlation,
since each observation is a series of zeros followed by a 1 (Chamberlain (1985)).
Following Allison (1982), I use a threshold model of technology diffusion rather than a hazard
model. The month dummies substitute for the hazard model’s flexible specification of baseline haz-
ard heterogeneity. The results in Tables 3 and 4 are representative of a variety of possible month
dummy and product/function/region interactions that I tried. This suggests that the current spec-
ification is able to control for selection and systematic differences in baseline adoption probabilities
for those who adopt in 2003 compared to those who adopt in 2001. In particular, the similarity of
the results, even allowing for differences in baseline hazards across different types, alleviates the
concern that there may be systematic differences in the evolution of the baseline hazard rate for
different types of employees that could contribute to measurement error.
I assume that an employee values adoption of video-messaging only by their contacts, rather
than valuing an increase in the network size in general. This is discussed in detail in Tucker (2007),
where I presents results showing that it is only the adoption decisions of others in the network
to whom potential adopters are directly connected that are statistically significant for adoption
decisions. Adoption by contacts to whom the employee is not directly linked does not have an effect
on their adoption decisions which is significantly different from zero.
The instrumental variables procedure allows the interpretation that Tables 3 and 4 capture the
reaction of a potential adopter to another’s adoption decision. Causation is established by isolating
the reaction of adopters to TV-inspired adoption decisions. It would be conventional in the case of
a communications technology to interpret these as a straightforward physical network externality.
An alternative interpretation is a “word-of-mouth” effect. This “word-of-mouth” effect could occur
when employees adopt video-messaging in response to the adoption of their contacts because these
contacts inform them of the merits of the technology. The empirical importance of word-of-mouth
in the diffusion of new products has received increasing attention in the marketing literature (Godes
and Mayzlin (2004)). Two factors, however, argue against a word-of-mouth interpretation in this
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case. First, there was no correlation in adoption in workplaces where one would expect a large word-
of-mouth effect. Second, statistical analysis of people’s reactions to those who used the technology
predominantly to watch TV did not show a similar size of network externality as for those who
used the technology to video-message.
7. Recreating the Communications Network
So far, all estimates have focused on how network externalities influence the adoption timing of the
1,294 employees who adopt the technology. However, this does not explore the equally interesting
question of why 824 employees did not adopt. The challenge of including these decisions in the
regressions is that we do not know whom the non-adopters would have video-messaged with if
they had adopted. The identification strategy rests crucially on differences in the location of each
employee’s contacts. One alternative for establishing whom non-adopters may have video-messaged
with is to use data from existing communication networks, such as e-mail records or telephone
records, and assume that video-messaging would follow a similar pattern. For reasons of legal
confidentiality, however, I have not been given access to such data. Therefore, I use the video-
messaging behavior of adopters to predict whom non-adopters would have video-messaged with if
they had adopted.
Since using adopter behavior to predict non-adopter behavior requires some strong assumptions,
in this section I lay down the empirical steps that lead to this strong model of non-adopter behavior.
In essence, I assume that the mathematical structure of the relationship between adopter charac-
teristics and their contacts applies out of sample, to non-adopters. In other words, there are a set
of Z features of users that generate a set of contacts, W. However, I observe this relationship W(Z)
only when an employee adopts. I do not observe W(Z) when the threshold condition is not met
and there is no adoption. Table 6 presents estimates for employee adoption as a function of Z. The
probability of adoption is increasing in certain characteristics, in particular whether the adopter is
European, in Admin, or a manager.
The number of contacts an employee has varies significantly with the employee’s role in the
firm. Table 6 also illustrates that the size of the contact list for adopters is increasing in the same
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Table 6 Adoption and Contacts by Adopter Characteristic
Percentage Non-Adopter Percentage Adopter Number of Contacts
Region
Asia 52 48 11
Europe 14 86 26
UK 17 83 21
US 45 55 17
Function
Admin 9 91 35
Research 38 62 17
Sales 27 73 18
Trading 41 59 18
Title
Associate 56 44 16
VP 36 64 18
Director 18 82 19
MD 8 92 28
characteristics as their propensity to adopt. For example, not only are European-based employees,
Managing Directors and Administrators more likely to adopt, but they are also more likely to
have more contacts. I cannot, on the basis of this evidence, conclude what the contact list would
have looked like for non-adopters. However, if I assume both follow the same function, then any
simulation of the post-adoption contact list for the non-adopters should show that the non-adopters
have a lower number of simulated contacts. It is therefore reassuring that I predict a mean of 15
contacts for non-adopters and 22 contacts for adopters in my simulation of the network, with a
standard error of prediction of (0.004). This is consistent with the basic predictions of the underlying
network model. Under this strong assumption, that the nature of contacts can be predicted reliably
on user characteristics, I can define a “strong model” where contacts are generated by the same
underlying process for adopters and non-adopters. It is for this strong model that I present results
on network externalities.
The actual procedure I use for simulating the network is more nuanced than suggested by Table
6. This is a sparse network. Out of 1.5 million potential links, there were only 23,805 actual
links. To predict whom non-adopters would have called, I take the last 12 months’ calling data
as representative of communications in the firm, and use it to estimate communication choices. I
regress an indicator variable for whether or not i video-messaged j or j video-messaged i on a vector
of interaction dummies for each pair of caller i and callee j’s characteristics. These interaction
dummies include an indicator variable for every possible combination of caller city and callee city.
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The interaction variable for a caller in New York and a callee in London captures the incremental
effect on the probability of a link if the caller is based in New York and the callee is based in
London. There are also interaction dummies for every possible combination of caller and callee title,
product, product market, specialization and title in the firm (See Table EC.8 for a full description).
For each non-adopter i, I use the sum of these probabilities to predict the total number of
contacts they would have called if everyone in the firm had adopted. I determine the predicted
composition of their contacts by ranking the predicted likelihoods of employee i calling employee j.
For adopters, I use a similar methodology to predict the unobserved part of their contact network.
To evaluate how well this procedure predicts contacts, I redid the above, using data for adopters
from August 2001-August 2002 to predict contacts for those who adopted in August 2002-August
2003. The results suggested that contacts are predicted correctly approximately 60% of the time.
Table 7 gives the results for this full dataset that includes the decisions of non-adopters never to
adopt. The results suggest that adoption decisions by managers have larger network externalities
on the adoption of both workers and managers than adoption by workers. In this specification,
adoption decisions by workers have a statistically insignificant effect for both managers and workers.
The results that adjust network externality size by measures of centrality are slightly different
from before. While the betweenness of a worker undoubtedly has a larger impact than closeness or
degrees on the adoption decisions of workers, it no longer has a statistically significant impact on
the adoption decisions of managers. It is also noticeable that weighting network externalities by
centrality leads to a general lack of significance when measuring the impact of managers on both
worker and manager adoption. Again, there are no statistically significant results from allowing
network externalities to vary in size depending on Bonacich Power.
It is noticeable that the results for distance remain the most similar to before, with both managers
and workers receiving positive network externalities from the adoption of workers who are close
by and the adoption of managers who are far away. One explanation for the fact that these results
more closely echo the previous results is that distance between non-adopting contacts can be
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measured precisely, whereas the centrality measures rely on an accurate prediction of the unseen
video-messaging network.
In general, though, these results are reassuring that the previous results in Table 4, showing
how heterogenous network externalities affect the timing of adoption by employees who do adopt,
also apply to whether employees adopt. In both cases, network externalities are greater in size for
managers and “between” workers than for regular workers.
7.1. Limitations
There are limitations in how widely these results can be applied. I am able to estimate precisely
how adoption by other employees affects the timing of adoption for employees who ultimately adopt
a particular technology in a single firm at a certain point of time. Since this is a communications
technology, it is natural to interpret these adoption responses as a network externality, and I
provide some limited evidence that suggests that they were not “word-of-mouth” effects. I extend
these results to non-adopters to allow analysis of the adoption decision itself, though the trade-off
in using predicted networks is less precision in estimation. It is also important to be clear that the
network for which I estimate these network externalities is the one for video-messaging. This may
not resemble the communications networks for other technologies.
8. Conclusion and Implications
This paper identifies network externalities at the individual level and then uses that identification
strategy to evaluate how network externalities vary in size with well-recognized measures of formal
and informal influence within the firm. My estimates show a great deal of heterogeneity in the size
of network externalities that one individual confers on another’s adoption decision. I am able to
identify this individual heterogeneity by using a unique identification strategy. I use variation in
how someone’s contacts value the technology’s stand-alone use of watching television as a quasi-
experiment that leads to exogenous changes in a potential adopter’s installed base. This allows me
to identify an individual-level causal network externality, that is, how one person’s adoption of a
network good depends on who else is in the network to communicate with. This use of variation
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Table 7 Predicted Network: Comparison of Different Centrality Measures
Managers
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
Installed Worker 0.0102 0.0101 0.0152*** 0.0088*** 0.0213 -0.0221***
(0.0157) (0.0150) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0231) (0.0059)
Installed Manager 0.0190*** -0.0401 -0.0244 -0.0121 0.0262 0.0899***
(0.0041) (0.0477) (0.0200) (0.0100) (0.0408) (0.0226)
TV in employee’s region 0.3295*** 0.4527*** 0.3903*** 0.3703*** 0.4543*** 0.4142***
(0.0825) (0.0869) (0.0814) (0.0817) (0.0780) (0.0803)
Observations 8186 8186 8186 8186 8186 8186
Workers
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
Installed Worker 0.0089 0.0586*** 0.0124*** 0.0102*** 0.0290 -0.0241***
(0.0220) (0.0178) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0197) (0.0050)
Installed Manager 0.0272*** -0.0731 0.0034 -0.0024 -0.0026 0.0735***
(0.0034) (0.0963) (0.0186) (0.0125) (0.0418) (0.0269)
TV in employee’s region 0.4979*** 0.6690*** 0.5057*** 0.5324*** 0.6017*** 0.5503***
(0.0614) (0.0655) (0.0617) (0.0607) (0.0586) (0.0588)
Observations 23603 23603 23603 23603 23603 23603
Dependent Variable: Indicator for when an employee first makes an outward video-messaging call
Sample: All employees who have not yet made a video-messaging call
Dummies for month, region, title, product included in all regressions
Instruments for the heterogeneity-weighted installed base are the heterogeneity-weighted TV valuation of each
employee’s manager and worker contacts. TV valuation is the % of prior adopters who watch local TV in that
contact’s region in the next month.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
at the individual level sets this research apart from previous research on network externalities.
Previous research has had to make strong assumptions about the randomness of timing of aggregate
shocks to a network. In addition to a more robust identification strategy, this exogenous variation
allows analysis of whether network externalities have a similar pattern of heterogeneity to other
social processes affecting diffusion.
Generally, technology management policy towards encouraging diffusion of network technologies
has followed the predictions of the theoretical literature on network externalities, and has focused
on maximizing network size. My results suggest that this policy approach will not be optimal in
all circumstances. A more appropriate policy, for similar technologies, would be to focus incentives
at marginal influentials who are potential leaders of others’ adoption, as opposed to the marginal
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user in general. My results also emphasize that it is not enough to target only those who occupy
positions of formal authority. It is also important to target those who have influence because they
occupy key positions spanning disparate communication networks or, potentially, those who are
central to the communications network.
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Supporting Empirical Evidence
EC.1. Details about the Call Data
Table EC.1 illustrates how calls ended. In my empirical analysis, I exclude calls which were refused
or where the call timed out. Table EC.2 illustrates the relative proportion of two-way video-
messaging calls and one-way calls where video was broadcast in only one direction. The majority of
these one-way calls were television broadcasts. These proportions suggest that the network usage
of video-messaging dominated the stand-alone usage of TV, in terms of call volume.
Table EC.1 How the Call Ended by Call Duration
EndEvent No Call Duration Positive Call Duration Total
Allocation Failed 66 0 66
Collapsed 781 30,518 31,299
Error 76,780 110,110 186,890
Forwarded 14,450 64,064 78,514
Hangup 180,229 1,532,876 1,713,105
Redirected 4,129 57,608 61,737
Refused 82,404 144 82,548
Ring Timeout 363,930 2,314 366,244
Total 722,769 1,797,634 2,520,403
All calls with no call duration, that are refused or where the ring times out are dropped from the data
Table EC.2 Number of Two-Way video-messaging Calls and One Way TV calls
Item Number of Calls Percent
One Way 752,055 30
Two Way 1,768,348 70
Total 2,520,403 100
EC.2. Details about the Personnel Data
The data do not indicate whether personnel details changed between January 2001 to August 2004.
It is more likely that an employee got promoted than changed work group or city, given geographic
immobility and group-specific human capital. Accordingly, an employee is described as a manager
if she was on an upwards career trajectory which meant she would be a manager by 2004. The
personnel records do not include data on employees who left the firm before 2004. Observations of
these employees’ calling patterns are excluded from the dataset.
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The dataset excludes 127 personnel records of employees who joined the firm after January 2001:
The unfavorable business climate from 2001-2003 means that the firm made few new appointments.
The dataset also excludes 18 employees in Moscow, Bangkok and Athens, since the video-messaging
infrastructure did not connect to these cities.
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EC.3. Relationship Between Usage Intensity and Adoption
Table EC.3 illustrates the relationship between adoption in each month and the subsequent inten-
sity of usage. It is clear there is no monotonic relationship between how early someone adopted and
how much they ultimately used the technology. One interpretation is that this reflects the lack of
video-messaging use by groups of early adopters who adopted the technology to watch television.
The measure of what proportion of how many days each month an employee spent using the tech-
nology is somewhat distorted upwards by a few extreme values. A few Scandinavian employees left
their video-message screen open for days on end. Figure EC.1 provides evidence that the number
of different people that an adopter calls on average remains relatively stable over time. Figures
EC.2 explores the relationship between the number of calls and the timing of adoption, and it is
clear that again this is not monotonic. Figure EC.3 explores the relationship between the number
of contacts and number of calls, and shows that in general employees who have more contacts are
making more calls to these contacts.
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Table EC.3 Relationship between Adoption timing and Usage intensity
Year-Month
of Adoption
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Figure EC.1 Stability in Video-messaging Behavior over Time
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Figure EC.2 Relationship between Number of Calls and Timing of Adoption
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Figure EC.3 Relationship between Number of Calls and Number of Contacts
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EC.4. Calculations of Social Network Centrality Measures
All measures of centrality were calculated using the software package UCinet written by Borgatti
et al. (2002). Though these measures are very familiar to sociologists, they are unfamiliar to
economists. Table EC.4 provides a description of the basic concepts behind the calculation of social
network measures. Table 1 provides a technical description of how Borgatti et al. (2002) calculates
each of the different measures of centrality.
Table EC.4 Social Network Analysis Terminology
Name Description
Vertex A node in a network (in my case, the position the contact
occupies in the video-messaging network)
Geodesic Shortest path between two vertices
Adjacency matrix A n by n matrix that summarizes whether is a link between
any of the n vertices in a network
Table EC.5 How centrality measures are calculated
Name Description
Formal Influence
Managerial Status Indicator variable for whether a contact has a title of Director
or higher
Informal Influence
Betweenness Proportion of all geodesics linking vertex j and vertex k
which pass through vertex i. Formula given by Freeman
(1977)
Closeness The reciprocal of a contact’s length of geodesic to every other
vertex.




Aij(α+βcj), where A is the adjacency, cj is the centrality
of vertex j, and α is a normalization factor. In my specifica-
tion β=1.
Distance Distance in km between the employee’s city and the contact’s
city calculated using air travel distances
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EC.5. Robustness Checks for Network Measures
As a robustness check I also estimated a linear probability model specification to verify my results.
This allowed me (unlike in the Newey two-step methodology) to implement different specifications
of the error term such as allowing for robustness. Reassuringly, the results suggest that little
changed even when errors were clustered at the regional level.
Table EC.6 Linear Probability Robustness Checks for Base Specification
Managers Workers
Standard Robust Clust.Region Standard Robust Clust.Region
Installed Worker 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Installed Manager 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0174* 0.0073*** 0.0073** 0.0073**
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0015)
TV in employee’s region 0.0280* 0.0280* 0.0280** 0.0387*** 0.0387*** 0.0387*
(0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0086) (0.0073) (0.0084) (0.0151)
Observations 4635 4635 4635 8088 8088 8088
Dependent Variable: Indicator for when an employee first makes an outward video-messaging call
Sample: Adopters who have not yet made a video-messaging call
Dummies for month, region, title, product included in all regressions
Instruments for the heterogeneity-weighted installed base are the heterogeneity-weighted TV valuation of each
employee’s manager and worker contacts. TV valuation is measured by the % of prior adopters who watch local TV
in that contact’s region in the next month.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table EC.7 Linear Probability Model: Reflecting different effects of Centrality
Managers
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
Installed Worker 0.0003 0.0014*** 0.0074** 0.0010* -0.0048 -0.0024*
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0031) (0.0005) (0.0036) (0.0012)
Installed Manager 0.0174*** 0.0030 0.0272** 0.0030 -0.0043 0.0077
(0.0046) (0.0024) (0.0109) (0.0026) (0.0053) (0.0047)
TV in employee’s region 0.0280* 0.0299* 0.0287* 0.0317** 0.0530*** 0.0436***
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0153)
Observations 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635
Workers
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
Installed Worker 0.0022*** 0.0015*** 0.0084*** 0.0012*** -0.0016 -0.0024***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0008)
Installed Manager 0.0073** 0.0036* 0.0401** 0.0053** -0.0039 0.0011
(0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0159) (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0045)
TV in employee’s region 0.0387*** 0.0394*** 0.0394*** 0.0376*** 0.0504*** 0.0433***
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0083)
Observations 8088 8088 8088 8088 8088 8088
Dependent Variable: Indicator for when an employee first makes an outward video-messaging call
Sample: Adopters who have not yet made a video-messaging call
Dummies for month, region, title, product included in all regressions
Instruments for the heterogeneity-weighted installed base are the heterogeneity-weighted TV valuation of each
employee’s manager and worker contacts. TV valuation is measured by the % of prior adopters who watch local TV
in that contact’s region in the next month.
Robust Standard Errors: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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EC.6. Prediction of Networks
I use a linear probability model to obtain estimates of what characteristics affect an adopter’s deci-
sion to video-message another employee. Table EC.8 summarizes and provides a precise description
of the dependent variable and the RHS variables. I use a linear probability model because I have
nearly 10,000 right-hand-side variables, and because probit specifications are notoriously bad at
handling large numbers of dummy variables. Reassuringly, when I compare the results for a pro-
bit specification with a linear probability model for a more restricted number of right-hand-side
variables, they produce similar predictions.
Table EC.8 Description of variables used in prediction of contacts
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
LHS Variable
Link Indicator Variable for whether
employee i and employee j make a
video-messaging call from August
2003 to August 2004
0.0045 0.067
RHS Variables
26x26 Interaction Dummies between i and j’s city location
64x64 Interaction Dummies between i and j’s field of specialization
4x4 Interaction Dummies between i and j’s title
2x2 Interaction Dummies between i and j’s product
7x7 Interaction Dummies between i and j’s geographical product market
Total Observations:4,541,161
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EC.7. Robustness Checks for Predicted Measures
Table EC.9 Linear Probability Model: Reflecting effects of centrality for predicted behavior of non-adopters
Managers
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
Installed Worker 0.0009 0.0039*** 0.0023*** 0.0014*** 0.0031 -0.0026***
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0008)
Installed Manager 0.0027*** -0.0062 -0.0025 -0.0016 0.0019 0.0076***
(0.0006) (0.0045) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0039) (0.0016)
TV in employee’s region 0.0349*** 0.0425*** 0.0422*** 0.0402*** 0.0502*** 0.0459***
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0092)
Observations 8186 8186 8186 8186 8186 8186
Workers
Regular Betweenness Closeness Degrees Power Distance
Installed Worker 0.0003 0.0009 0.0017*** 0.0009*** 0.0018 -0.0016***
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0004)
Installed Manager 0.0023*** -0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0034***
(0.0003) (0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0012)
TV in employee’s region 0.0261*** 0.0304*** 0.0285*** 0.0280*** 0.0312*** 0.0299***
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Observations 23603 23603 23603 23603 23603 23603
Dependent Variable: Indicator for when an employee first makes an outward video-messaging call
Sample: All employees who have not yet made a video-messaging call
Dummies for month, region, title, product included in all regressions
Instruments for the heterogeneity-weighted installed base are the heterogeneity-weighted TV valuation of each
employee’s manager and worker contacts. TV valuation is measured by the % of prior adopters who watch local TV
in that contact’s region in the next month.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Robust Standard Errors
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EC.8. Influence of Direct and Indirect Contacts
In my regressions, I focus only on the influence of the adoption decisions of direct contacts. However,
theoretically, indirect contacts may matter too if employees place an option value on their being in
the network. To test this, I estimated another specification that included both the installed base
of direct contacts and the installed base of indirect contacts. The results in Table EC.10 provide
empirical evidence that suggests that only direct contacts have a significant impact on adoption
decisions.
Table EC.10 Only Direct Contacts Matter
Managers Workers
Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV
Installed Worker 0.0044 0.0007 0.0230*** 0.0151**
(0.0064) (0.0099) (0.0054) (0.0065)
Installed Manager 0.1514*** 0.0997*** 0.0688*** 0.0597**
(0.0196) (0.0286) (0.0201) (0.0276)
Installed Worker 2 0.0015 0.0024 -0.0013 -0.0000
(0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0017) (0.0025)
Installed Manager 2 -0.0022 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0017)
TV in employee’s region 0.1693* 0.1815* 0.3758*** 0.3892***
(0.0962) (0.0979) (0.0790) (0.0826)
Observations 4520 4520 7933 7933
Dependent Variable: Indicator for when an employee first makes an outward video-messaging call
Sample: Employees who have not yet made a video-messaging call
Dummies for month, region, title, product included in all regressions
Instruments for the different installed base measures are the TV valuation of each employee’s direct and indirect
manager and worker contacts. TV valuation is measured by the % of prior adopters who watch local TV in that
contact’s region in the next month. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
